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ABSTRACT
A concern in higher education policy is that students are taking longer to graduate. One possible
reason for this observation is an increase in off-campus labor market participation among college
students. Financial aid may play a role in the labor/study choice of college students—as college
becomes more affordable, students my substitute away from work and toward increased study. I
use data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) to exploit nonlinearity in
the Pell Grant formula to estimate a regression kink and regression discontinuity designs. I find
that conditional on receiving the minimum of $550, students reduce their labor supply by 0.4
hours per week, which translates to a 2.4 percent decrease in hours worked. Students who receive
the average Pell Grant of $2,250 are 7.6 percentage points (or around 12 percent) less likely to
work and, if working, supply 5.10 less hours per week, or around 30.67 percent reduction. I find
Pell Grants do increase academic achievement, implying that students substitute study time for
work.
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Introduction

A concern in U.S. higher education is the increasing time that it takes the average undergraduate to complete a four-year degree (Bound, Loveheim and Turner, 2010, 2012). One
possible reason for this increase is that more students are working off campus than ever
before (Scott-Clayton, 2012; Darolia, 2014; Scott-Clayton and Minaya, 2016; Stoddard and
Urban, 2019). This change in behavior may be a result of decreasing amounts of per student
financial aid at a time when tuition hikes outpace the rate of inflation. If college tuition
net of financial aid is increasing, then students may need to work more to fund their college
education, especially if they come from lower-income households or are credit constrained.
This paper examines a causal link between the amount of financial aid that a student
receives (via the Pell Grant) and student labor supply on both the intensive and extensive
margins. I use a regression kink/regression discontinuity design to identify this causal effect.
Regression kink is a relatively new technique and was introduced by Card et al. (2015).
Turner (2017) first proposed using the regression kink method to exploit kinks and discontinuities in the Pell Grant formula to compare differences in price discrimination from Pell
Grants in for-profit versus traditional universities. Turner and Marx (2018) also use this
method to identify the causal effect of Pell Grants on student loan debt.1 This model allows me to study how students change their labor supply decision from a quasi-experimental
standpoint by examining those students who are close to the eligibility cutoff (regression
discontinuity) and the students who are close to changes in the marginal implicit tax on
income because of nonlinearities (regression kink) in the Pell Grant formula.2
1

Researchers have used the regression kink method to identify causal effects in a number of other settings,
including the effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit on labor supply (Jones, 2013), the effects of kinks in
the tax code on labor supply (Chetty, 2012; Chetty et al., 2011), the effects of an increase in tax returns
on college enrollment (Manoli and Turner, 2018), and the effects of unemployment benefits on labor supply
(Landais, 2015)
2
Jeffrey T. Denning and Turner (2019) also use this technique to estimate the effects of Pell Grants on
college competition and earnings postgraduation. Evans and Nguyen (2019) use a regression discontinuity to
show that Pell Grants reduce student loan balances. Eng and Matsudaira (2021) use a similar methodology
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The relationship between student labor supply and college outcomes is unclear, and
there is little research that explores why students may choose to work and how employment
affects academic outcomes. Some researchers have found that students who allocate more
time toward work have lower grades (Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010; Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner, 2003; Liu, 2020) and take longer to graduate (Darolia, 2014; Ehrenberg and
Sherman, 1984). However, working a small amount in college, in a field that is connected to
the student’s major or desired occupation, may be beneficial because it allows the student
to gain job experience and establish a professional network (Ruhm, 1997; Light, 2001, 1998).
This paper also adds to the literature by expanding economists’ understanding of how
transfer payments affect labor supply. Most of the literature has focused on policies designed
to help the working poor. Results regarding the effect of cash transfers on labor supply are
mixed. For example, Meyer (2002) finds that the changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) decreases labor supply on the extensive, but not intensive, margins. However, Jones
(2013) finds that workers who face a higher implicit tax because of the loss of EITC do
reduce work hours, but this result is only robust for single mothers with one child. Eissa
and Hoynes (2004) find that an increase in the implicit tax from the EITC increases male
labor supply by a small amount but decreases female labor supply by a greater amount, thus
offsetting any gains. Regarding other programs, Hoynes (1996) finds that Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent Program decreased labor supply greatly for
families eligible for the program, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) find that Medicaid has a large effect
on labor supply on all margins, and Depew (2012) finds that mandating dependent health
insurance in the Affordable Care Act reduces labor supply of young adults. One possible
reason for the disparate results from these studies is that working poor families maximize
lifetime consumption and may behave differently given their family makeup and whether the
researcher is examining a marginal or average treatment effect. College students are different
to find small effects on college completion rates and earnings.
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in that they maximize utility where present consumption is one input in addition to time
spent studying and on leisure. Thus, college students may be more sensitive to changes in
the amount of scholarship that they receive and reallocate their time toward other pursuits
that may differ from the working poor receiving welfare aid.
The effects of financial aid on education outcomes are a popular area for researchers.
Previous research shows that financial aid can influence whether a student enrolls in college (Nielsen, Sørensen and Taber, 2010; Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar, 2006; Leslie and
Brinkman, 1987; van der Klaauw, 2002; Dynarski, 2000), the type and prestige of the university that the student attends (Avery and Hoxby, 2004), and the probability a student
persists to graduation in a timely matter (Bettinger, 2004; Larry D. Singell, 2004; Alon,
2007; Novak and McKinney, 2011; McKinney and Novak, 2013). Researchers have used a
similar regression discontinuity design concerning eligibility for the minimum Pell Grant and
found Pell can reduce work and student loans in both four-year (Evans and Nguyen, 2019)
and community colleges (Park and Scott-Clayton, 2018). This paper adds to those findings
by examining both the minimum Pell Grant via a regression discontinuity, but also additional Pell Grant via a regression kink. While the data I use in this study do not allow me
to investigate the effect of student employment on long-term educational outcomes, I can
establish a causal link between Pell Grants and student employment, which may then feed
back into grades or persistence to graduation.

2

Pell Grants and Nonlinear Eligibility Rules

The Pell Grant program is arguably the largest financial aid program that is a grant as
opposed to a loan. The federal government has dramatically expanded the program since
its inception in 1965 by increasing both the maximum award and loosening the eligibility
requirements. The Department of Education pays Pell Grant dollars directly to the institu-
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tion, and the federal government does not require that students pay the aid back. However,
Pell Grant eligibility is means tested, and a student’s academic aptitude, career aspirations,
gender, or race do not factor into the decision.
To be eligible for a Pell Grant, students must complete the Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).3 The FAFSA is very complex and is sometimes a deterrent
to students who may be unfamiliar with the process or have incorrect ideas about their
eligibility; this can result in students forgoing significant amounts of financial aid (Dynarski
and Scott-Clayton, 2006; Deming and Dynarski, 2010; Kofoed, 2017).
Once a student completes the FAFSA, the federal government uses information about
parent/student income, financial assets and other forms of savings, dependency status,4 number of siblings (for dependent students), and number of dependents (for independent students). Using this information, the government calculates the expected family contribution
(EFC), which measures how much the government believes that the student’s parents or the
individual student can contribute to his or her college expenses. The student does not know
the value of their EFC when they apply for aid or begin the college application process.
After the FAFSA deadline the federal government sends the student a notice with their EFC
and the amount of aid that the student will receive.
To calculate a student’s Pell Grant eligibility, the federal government subtracts the
EFC from the maximum Pell Grant that is set by Congress. The maximum Pell Grant has
changes over time and currently is $5,500.5 Thus the Pell Grant a student receives is equal
3
There is a long literature about the complexity of the FAFSA and its effects on college enrollment
and completion. Kofoed (2017) shows that many families leave thousands of dollars on the table for not
completing FAFSA. Bettinger et al. (2012) randomly provided high school students to assistance with FAFSA
completion from an H&R Block employee and find that those with help are more likely to enroll and complete
college. Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) show that these complexities are regressive and are an obstacle
to the equitable distribution of aid.
4
A student is considered independent if he or she is over the age of 24, has dependents, is married, or is a
military veteran; otherwise the student is considered independent. For the purpose of establishing financial
need, the government assumes that independent students do not receive parental support.
5
For the three waves of data that I use in this paper, the maximum Pell Grant is as follows: 2003–2004,
$4,050.00; 2007–2008, $4,310.00; 2011–2012, $5,500.00.
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to:

P ellit = (maxP ellt − EF Cit ) × 1[maxP ellt − EF Cit ≥ minP ellt ]
+ 400 × 1[maxP ellt − EF Cit ] ∈ [200, minP ellt )]. (1)

Figure 1 plots the amount of difference between maxP ellt and EF Cit against the
amount of Pell Grant a student receives in year t. This eligibility formula gives two nonlinearities that are useful for the regression kink/regression discontinuity design. First, any
student whose maxP ellt − EF Cit is less than $200 will not receive any aid. Once the
difference reaches $200.00, a student automatically receives $400.00 in Pell Grants, thus
creating a discontinuity. The amount of aid plateaus until the difference between maxP ellt
and EF Cit reaches $400.00, where a kink occurs and the student receives one dollar in
additional Pell Grant for each dollar increase in the difference. This increase in aid continues
until the difference is equal to or greater than maxP ellt , where the federal government
simply awards the student the maximum Pell Grant and, regardless of the student’s need,
the student receives no additional grant aid.6
The aid formula contains three nonlinearities that produce sources of exogenous identification that I use to identify a causal relationship between financial aid and student labor
supply. Turner (2017) first proposed the idea of using the Pell Grant formula with the regression kink technique and showed that universities reduce institutional aid for Pell Grant
recipients via price discrimination. Turner and Marx (2018) also use this technique to examine the effect of an increase in Pell Grants and the amount of debt a student incurs.
6

However, the federal government does begin to offer subsidized student loans to fill the gap up to a
maximum point where unsubsidized student loans are used to fill the gap completely.

6

3
3.1

Data and Summary Statistics
Description of Data

This study uses data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS). The
National Center of Education Statistics (NCES), a subsidiary of the U.S. Department of
Education, updates the NPSAS with a new cross section every four years. The main purpose of the NPSAS is to better understand how students pay for college. The data contain
information such as the amounts of grants, loans, work study program, state lottery programs, and payments from personal accounts. These data also contain information from
many sources, including student interviews, student responses to the FAFSA, and surveys
completed by college and university administrators about their institutions. For students
who do not complete FAFSA, the NCES imputes the values of key numbers such as the EFC
from tax records and responses to surveys. Data contained in the NPSAS describe student
characteristics such as grades, standardized test scores, and parents’ income. NPSAS also
identifies the college or university that the student attends and provides data about enrollment size, institutional control, and tuition pricing. All monetary variables are expressed in
2012 dollars.
The NPSAS creates a representative sample of typical college students for each of the
50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Each institution of higher education
that is eligible for federal student aid (i.e., Title IV compliant) is assigned a sampling probability and sampled with replacement so that the NPSAS creates a representative sample of
the college student population in each state. Further, to create a nationally representative
sample, the following states are oversampled to compensate for their comparative size: California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Texas. After the number of observations
per institution is determined, NCES randomly samples students such that the sample would
represent of the student body with regard to demographic information, types of financial
7

aid, and major selection.
For my sample, I include undergraduate students who attend either a public or traditional university. I also drop students who attend more than one institution in a given year
because their Pell Grant eligibility would change midyear. I also drop students who do not
complete the FAFSA form. While this may introduce self-selection bias into the results since
FAFSA is sufficiently complex and may deter students from completing FAFSA, including
nonapplicants may distort the “treatment effect” because of students who otherwise would
have been eligible for FAFSA but did not receive a Pell Grant. Including students who do
not complete FAFSA would thus sufficiently have noncompliance that it may be difficult to
isolate a causal effect given changes in the eligibility criteria.

3.2

Summary Statistics

The advantage of using the NPSAS is that it is representative of the universe of higher education. The data represent all types of students, including working students and community
college students, as well as those from regional universities and elite research universities.
These data are helpful in understanding student labor supply because they contain information on vulnerable populations and other populations of concern.
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. Column
(1) shows the overall summary statistics for the entire sample. The average student in my
sample works 16.85 hour per week (essentially part time), with 62.2 percent of students
working positive hours and participating in the labor force. Also, the average Pell Grant is
$1,614.32, with the average EFC being $6,375.99. The Department of Education uses the
EFC to determine Pell Grant eligibility and is a key measure of families’ and individuals’
ability to pay for college. Overall, 60.2 percent of my sample is female, while 18.2 and 15.2
percent are black and Hispanic, respectively. Also, 61.2 percent of the students in my sample
are dependents, and 77.7 percent are residents of the same state where their institution is
8

located. Finally, 63.3 percent of my sample attend college full time.
Next, I separate Pell-eligible (column [2]) from non-Pell-eligible (column [3]) students.
Between these two groups, there is roughly a third of an hour difference in the numbers of
hours worked, with Pell-eligible students working slightly more. However, students not
eligible for Pell Grants are more likely to participate in the labor market than students who
receive Pell Grants. Unsurprisingly, the average EFC is considerably higher for non-Pelleligible students. This result is large because it is common for a very poor student to receive
an EFC of zero, while there is no upper limit on EFC. There is a higher concentration of
female students who receive Pell Grants (64 percent of eligible students versus 57.1 percent of
noneligible). Among students who receive Pell Grants, nearly 25 percent are black and 17.4
percent are Hispanic, while the subset of students who are not Pell eligible is 8.5 percent
black and 7.8 percent Hispanic. Of students who receive Pell Grants, 41.9 percent are
dependent on the parents, which shows that a majority of Pell recipients do not depend on
their parents for support and are probably working. Students attending college in state and
full-time students are more likely to receive Pell Grants. While the full sample comparison
is quite similar, the regression discontinuity focuses on those students around the kink or
the cutoff.
Figure 2 shows the average Pell Grant plotted over the distance from eligibility cutoff.
Students who are eligible for Pell Grants are on the negative side of the axis (since EF Cit <
cutoff), while students who are not eligible are on the positive side. I have sorted students
into $100.00 EFC bins and plotted their Pell Grants. This plot shows that conditional on
completing financial aid, the amount of Pell Grant that the federal government gives to its
students complies closely to the eligibility formula shown in Figure 1. The NPSAS also
contains data regarding how much time students spend working. For this study, I do not
consider hours spent in the Federal Work Study Program, but am interested in student labor
supply off campus. Federal Work Study is also linked to completion of the FAFSA, but the
9

federal government controls how many hours a student can work. Thus, federal work study
students may not have as much of an ability to adjust work schedules as those who work off
campus.
Finally, I compare students on either side of the cutoff within a tighter bandwidth
of plus or minus $3,000 of EFC. Columns (4) and (5) compare these summary statistics.
First, it appears that within this bandwidth, similar students who are barely ineligible for
Pell Grants work 18.51 hours weekly, while those who barely qualify for a Pell Grant work
an average of 16.39 weekly labor hours. These columns also show that 67.7 percent of nonPell-eligible students work, while 60.3 percent of Pell-eligible students work. Finally, these
columns show that the differences demographically between the two groups begin the shrink
as the bandwidth tightens.

4

Identification Strategy and Empirical Model

I use regression discontinuity/ kinks in the Pell Grant eligibility formula to identify causally
the effect of Pell Grant receipt on college student labor supply. Turner (2017) first developed
and used this identification strategy to estimate the reduction in institutional aid caused by
Pell Grants. This reduction in aid estimates the degree of price-discriminating behavior by
the university.
While regression discontinuity is not necessarily a new technique, regression kink is
relatively new, even though it is based on the same principles as the regression discontinuity estimator. While the regression discontinuity design exploits the discontinuity in the
first derivative to create exogenous variation needed for identification, the regression kink
similarly uses a discontinuity in the second derivative. Regression kink has the potential to
increase the number of opportunities for causal inference because sharp changes in policy
rules are somewhat common compared to sharp cutoffs. However, similar to the regression
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discontinuity design, regression kinks require that exogenous variables be smooth around
the kink such that agents cannot manipulate their eligibility to perfectly sort into certain
outcomes.
Suppose that student labor supply LS is a function of Pell Grants (P ell) and EFC
such that

LS = f (P ell, τ ) + g(EF C) + U,

(2)

where U is a random error term consisting of a vector of unobservables. Identification for the
regression kink hinges on the validity of similar assumptions about regression discontinuities
(Card et al., 2015). First, in the neighborhood of the kink points, there cannot be any
discontinuities in the running variable; thus, there cannot be bunching of observations in
EFC around the kink points signifying that agents are “gaming the system” by reducing
their incomes such that they become eligible for more Pell Grant funds. This assumption
helps to ensure that EFC is independent of the Pell Grant cutoffs and that agents do not have
the ability to manipulate their own eligibility. Second, there cannot be any discontinuities
in the EFC as it relates to labor force participation and the number of hours worked. This
assumption guarantees that the estimated treatment effect (τ ) is the same regardless if one
decreases or increases the EFC by the same amount. These assumptions are necessary to
ensure that (while other factors are obviously influencing labor supply), in the neighborhood
of the kinks, the change in Pell Grant eligibility is as good as random to the student. Thus,
using both the minimum Pell Grant eligibility and kinks that alter the implicit tax of financial
aid on wages identifies the causal effect of Pell Grants on labor supply.
Assuming a linear relationship between Pell Grants and labor supply, then

f (P ell, τ ) = τ1 P ell,
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(3)

where τ1 represents the marginal effect of $1.00 of Pell Grant funds on the student’s labor
force participation and the number of hours worked.
If the previously stated assumptions hold, then I can estimate the treatment effect
by using the following regression kink and regression discontinuity estimates:

τRKD =

τRKD =

dE[LS |EF C=ef ck +]
dEF C
dE[P ell|EF C=ef ck +]
dEF C

lim→0+
lim→0+

− lim→0−
− lim→0−

dE[LS |EF C=ef ck +]
dEF C
dE[P ell|EF C=ef ck +]
dEF C

lim→0+ [LS |EF C = ef cd + ] − lim→0− [LS |EF C = ef cd + ]
.
lim→0+ [P ell|EF C = ef cd + ] − lim→0− [P ell|EF C = ef cd + ]

(4)

(5)

Since the maximum and minimum Pell Grant amounts change over time, I standardize
the running variable so that the dependent variable is the distance from the maximum Pell
gC it = EF Cit − ef cd ; where ef cd is the
Grant in a given year (maxP ellt ) such that EF
minimum Pell Grant or the discontinuity point. Given this standardization, Pell-eligible
gC it because EF Citc < ef cd .
students would have a negative EF
gC it measure, I estimate the following first stage and reduced form
Using this EF
estimates to calculate τRDD and τRKD :

gC it < 0] + α2 EF
gC it × 1[EF
gC it < 0] +
P ellit = α1 1[EF

X
gC it )ρ ] + νit
[ψρ (EF

(6)

ρ

gC it < 0] + β2 EF
gC it × 1[EF
gC it < 0] +
Lit = β1 1[EF

X

gC it )ρ ] + it ,
[ψρ (EF

(7)

ρ

where ρ is a polynomial that gives the estimation a flexible functional form around the kink
gC it < 0] indicates whether a
and discontinuity, and νit and it are error terms. The term 1[EF
student is eligible for a Pell Grant. I calculate the treatment effects by estimating τ̂RDD =
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β̂1
λ̂1

and τ̂RKD =

5
5.1

β̂2
.
λ̂2

Results
Internal Validity

The first step to ensure identification is to show that the needed assumptions for the regression discontinuity and regression kink estimators hold. I first sort observations into bins of
100 observations and then plot the variable of interest against the running variable. Figure
3 shows graphs of key covariates and their distributions close to the eligibility cutoff. These
variables include distance from Pell Grant eligibility cutoff, the percentage of non-white
students, the student’s high school GPA, and dependency status of the students.
The plots of these variables are important for different reasons. The first panel shows
gC it . This
the distribution of the running variable, distance from the eligibility cutoff, or EF
graph shows that the distribution is somewhat smooth around the cutoff, which is a key
assumption for identification. The other three panels show important demographic and academic explanatory variables, including percentage of nonwhite students, high school GPA,
and whether the student is considered dependent on the parents. The only dependent variable that seems to not be smooth around the cutoff is high school GPA. This graph shows
that high school GPA drops slightly for Pell-eligible students. This finding may be a result
of colinearity between a student’s high school GPA and demographic information such as
race, parents’ income, and family education background.
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5.2

Graphical Regression Discontinuity and Regression Kink Results

Figure 4 shows a graph of labor force participation, or labor supply on the extensive margin,
around the eligibility cutoff. In this figure, I have fit a line through the data just before the
Pell Grant eligibility and directly afterward. Recall that an increase in Pell Grant eligibility
makes the standardized distance to the cutoff more negative. Thus, as a student or student’s
family is more able to pay for college, the student receives less Pell Grant funds from the
government and increasingly decides to participate in the labor force to cover financial need.
However, once students cross the eligibility cutoff and are no longer eligible for a Pell Grant,
labor force participation jumps by nearly 7 percentage points and begins to decline again as
a student’s EFC increases.
Figure 4 shows a graph of the number of hours worked, or labor supply on the
extensive margin, around the eligibility cutoff. Again, I fit a line showing trends on either
side of the eligibility discontinuity. As a student’s Pell Grant is reduced along the regression
kink, the number of hours worked each week increases. Once a student is no longer eligible
for a Pell Grant, then the weekly number of hours worked increases discontinuously. While
they cannot be used for causal inference, these graphs help to visualize both the increase of
labor on the extensive and intensive margins while moving along the kink and around the
discontinuity.

5.3

Parametric Estimates from Regression Kink and Regression
Discontinuity Designs

I estimate Equations 6 and 7 for both whether a student participates in the labor market
and the number of hours worked. Using the coefficients from the estimates, I calculate
the treatment effect from both the regression discontinuity and the regression kink. To
14

account for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between labor supply and Pell Grants,
I use a flexible polynomial function form. I choose the optimal function form using the
Akaike information criterion (AIC). For each table, I show the polynomial order and the
accompanying AIC statistic. I also use the following variables as demographic controls:
race, gender, dependency status, if the student is a resident of the state of the college he
or she attends, whether the student attends school part or full time, whether the student is
pursuing an associate’s or bachelor’s degree, and year fixed effects.

5.3.1

Labor Supply on the Extensive Margin

Table 2 shows results for a linear probability model where the dependent variable is whether
a student participates in the labor market. I follow Turner (2017) by estimating the model
using the following bandwidths: Global [−4,600, 10,000], [−4,000, 4,000], and [−3,000, 3000].
Using the AIC, I find that the optimal polynomial functional form is ρ=3. The parameter
estimates, however, are somewhat robust across bandwidths. However, as the bandwidth
tightens, the estimates become less precise. However, regarding the tightest bandwidth, I
find that, on average, crossing the income eligibility for a Pell Grant increases the student’s
Pell Grant by $106.03, and as a student gains an extra dollar of EFC, their Pell Grant
increases by nearly $0.79.
Next, I estimate the effect of increasing $1.00 of EFC on the propensity of a student
deciding to participate in the labor force when they become eligible for the Pell Grant. I find
that, using the whole sample, becoming Pell eligible decreases the probability of labor force
participation by 3.9 percentage points, or (given a a base of 62.2 percent) 6.27 percent. As I
employ a tighter bandwidth, this result is around a 1.2 percentage point decrease, or about
two percent. While the tightest bandwidth reduces the sample size and decreases precision,
this result is economically significant because the minimum Pell Grant is only $400.00 in this
sample. Thus, students do seem willing to substitute work time when given a Pell Grant.
15

I show the treatment effects of Pell Grants on labor force participation in the third
panel of Table 2. I find that one additional $1,000 of Pell Grant aid decreases the probability
that a student participates in the labor force by 4.73 percentage points. Given that the
average Pell Grant is $2,012.00 this result means that the average Pell Grant decreases
probability of employment by 9.52 percentage points or 14.27 percent reduction from a
mean of 67.7 percent.

5.3.2

Labor Supply on the Intensive Margin

Table 3 shows results for the weekly number of hours worked or labor supply on the intensive
margin. I estimate the model using the following bandwidths: Global, [−4,600, 10,000],
[−4,000, 4,000], and [−3,000, 3,000]. I find that as the bandwidth tightens around the
discontinuity and the kink, the coefficients decrease in magnitude, but the estimates become
more precise. I use these coefficient estimates to calculate the treatment effect of both the
discontinuity and kink.
First, I find that the optimal functional form is a polynomial of the order of 3 for
each of the bandwidths. As before, I find that, on average, a student who is eligible for
a Pell Grant receives $173.80 of Pell Grant (for the tightest bandwidth). This result is on
par with the average minimum Pell Grant, across years and adjusted for inflation. As a
gC it ) the treatment effect becomes
student approaches the eligibility cutoff, (i.e., P ell × EF
more positive such that each additional dollar of EFC increases a student’s Pell Grant by
$0.067.
I find that as a student receives more Pell Grant around the regression discontinuity,
the student’s labor supply on the intensive margin decreases. I also find that as students
become eligible for a Pell Grant and receive the minimum Pell Grant of $400.00, their labor
supply decreases by 0.001 hours per dollar of grant aid or 0.4 hours per week for the minimum
Pell Grant. Since the average student in my sample works 16.63 hours per week, this result
16

indicates that students will reduce their labor supply by 2.4 percent.
Additionally, I find that students around the kink in the eligibility formula decrease
their labor hours in response to an increase in the amount of Pell Grant award offered by
the federal government. The tightest bandwidth indicates that as a student qualifies for
more Pell Grant funding, their labor supply will decrease by 0.002 hours for every dollar.
Considering that the average Pell Grant (conditional on being eligible for a Pell Grant) is
$2,547.81, then the average Pell Grant recipient would reduce their labor supply by 5.10
hours per week. Since the average student works 21.15 hours per week, this estimate implies
that the average Pell Grant recipient will reduce their weekly labor supply by 30.67 percent.

5.3.3

Effects of Pell Grants on Academic Achievement

Given these results regarding a reduction in labor supply, it would be useful to know if
students are using this time to increase their studies or for other less useful activities. To
address this question, I use the end of year grade point average (GPA) for each student as
a dependent variable. I estimate the same specification across the same bandwidths that I
used earlier.
Table 4 displays the results from these specifications. The first panel shows the effects
of the eligibility cutoff and kink on Pell Grant receipt. The sample changes slightly from
the previous tables because there are less missing variables in GPA than in student labor
supply hours. I find that within the $4,000.00 bandwidth, crossing over the eligibility cutoff
increases Pell Grant receipt by $152.00.
The next panel shows the effect of eligibility rules on a student’s GPA. I find that
crossing the eligibility increases a students GPA by 0.088 of a GPA point (or about a third
of a +/− increase—i.e., moving from a B to a B+). I also find that each additional dollar
of EFC increases a student’s GPA by 0.005 points. The ratio of these two results is the
local average treatment effect and helps scale up the results in dollar terms. The regression
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discontinuity results imply that an additional dollar of the minimum Pell Grant increases a
student’s GPA by 0.026 GPA points. Given that the average minimum Pell Grant for the
years in my sample was $400.00, just the minimum Pell Grant receipt increases a student’s
GPA by 10.4 GPA points (or roughly a third of a +/− grade). The regression kink results
show that each additional dollar of Pell Grant increases a student’s GPA by 0.006 point.
Again, assuming the average Pell Grant of $2,547.81, then a student’s GPA increases by
0.15 points (or roughly half of a +/− average). While these grade results are small, they
are statistically significant and suggest that students substitute some of their labor time to
increase their studying.

6

Conclusion

With increasing tuition costs, financial aid has become a vital part of the college experience.
However, in many cases, aid and parental contributions are not enough to alleviate students’
financial need. Thus, many students turn to employment off campus to fill the gap. The
literature regarding how students seek outside employment, what factors contribute to their
decision, and how it affects education outcomes is sparse. Essentially, working while in college
can have both positive and negative effects. First, students who participate in the labor
market have less time for other pursuits, especially academic and social. This reallocation
of time may affect crucial outcomes such as grades, major choice, and time to graduation.
However, if the student is employed in a job related to his or her major, the work experience
may complement the academic, and the student may increase the probability of employment
because he or she has established a professional network.
Financial aid may affect this decision to work in college similar to how transfer payment programs (e.g., the EITC, unemployment and disability insurance) affect the labor
supply. A student who wishes to spend maximum time in the classroom may be very re-
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sponsive to financial aid as opposed to a worker trying to maximize lifetime earnings. I
use the rich data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study combined with a discontinuity and kinks in the Pell Grant eligibility formula to study causally the effect of Pell
Grant programs and student labor supply on the intensive and extensive margins. I find that
students respond to financial aid by decreasing the probability that that they participate in
the labor force and the number of hours that a student works if they do choose to work.
The policy prescriptions of my study hinges on whether employment is helpful or harmful
to academic outcomes. If working does reduce GPAs and increases time to graduation, then
perhaps the federal government should consider expanding the Pell Grant program to help
deter needy students from working. If employment serves as a complement to academic
learning, then the federal government should promote internships and apprenticeships instead of unconditional grant aid as means to encourage students to gain work experience
while in college.
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Figure 1: This figure displays the amount of Pell Grant a student receives against a student’s
eligibility.
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Figure 2: For this figure, I have sorted the data into $100.00 EFC bins to see if the data are
compliant with the Pell Eligibility formula presented in the previous figure. Since a student
is eligible when EF Cit is less than the cutoff, students who are Pell Eligible are located in
the negative space, while noneligible students are in positive space. SOURCE: The sample
consists of the 1995–1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–2012 waves of the
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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Smoothness of Covariates Around the Cutoff

Figure 3: These four panels show evidence for the assumption of smoothness in the neighborhood of the discontinuity. The first shows how the running variable is smooth around the
discontinuity as is the percentage of students who are nonwhite and dependent. However,
high school GPA shows a slight break around the cutoff. I have sorted the data into $100.00
EFC bins. Since a student is eligible when EF Cit is less than the cutoff, students who
are Pell eligible are located in the negative space, while noneligible students are in positive
space. SOURCE: The sample consists of the 1995–1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008,
and 2011–2012 waves of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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Student Labor Force Participation around Pell Eligibility Cutoff

Figure 4: This figure is a plot of the percentage of students who participate in the labor force
in each $100.00 EFC bin. Notice that as a student loses Pell Grant funding, the probability
of work increase until it jumps at the eligibility cutoff. Since a student is eligible when
EF Cit is less than the cutoff, students who are Pell eligible are located in the negative
space, while noneligible students are in positive space. SOURCE: The sample consists of
the 1995–1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–2012 waves of the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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Student Work Hours around Pell Eligibility Cutoff

Figure 5: This figure shows a plot of the average weekly hours worked in each $100.00 EFC
bin. Notice that as a student loses Pell Grant funding, the average weekly hours worked
increases until it jumps at the eligibility cutoff. Since a student is eligible when EF Cit
is less than the cutoff, students who are Pell eligible are located in the negative space,
while noneligible students are in positive space. SOURCE: The sample consists of the 1995–
1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011-2012 waves of the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Pell Eligibility
(1)
Variable
Hours worked
Any work
Pell Grant
Expected family contribution
Female
Black
Hispanic
Dependent
Resident
Full time

Obs.

Overall

(2)

(3)
Full Sample
Pell Eligible Not Pell Eligible

(4)
(5)
Bandwidth EFC +/− $3,000
Pell Eligible Not Pell Eligible

16.85
(16.70)
0.622
(0.485)
1,614.32
(1,838.99)
6,375.99
(11,906.42)
0.602
(0.489)
0.182
(0.386)
0.152
(0.359)
0.612
(0.541)
0.777
(0.416)
0.633
(0.482)

16.98
(16.96)
0.607
(0.488)
2,547.81
(1,720.48)
732.55
(1,209.15)
0.624
(0.484)
0.235
(0.424)
0.190
(0.392)
0.497
(0.559)
0.805
(0.396)
0.612
(0.487)

16.63
(16.25)
0.648
(0.478)
0.68
(33.10)
16,133.31
(15,299.79)
0.564
(0.496)
0.091
(0.287)
0.088
(0.283)
0.810
(0.443)
0.730
(0.444)
0.670
(0.470)

16.39
(16.69)
0.603
(0.489)
1,361.05
(962.37)
1813.36
(962.37)
0.607
(0.489)
0.185
(0.388)
0.152
(0.359)
0.690
(0.628)
0.673
(0.469)
0.600
(0.490)

18.51
(16.65)
0.677
(0.468)
1.836
(53.20)
5,207.58
(1,400.57)
0.570
(0.495)
0.120
(0.325)
0.109
(0.312)
0.722
(0.448)
0.723
(0.448)
0.638
(0.481)

251,230

159,160

92,060

54,670

25,070

NOTE: Observation totals are rounded to the nearest tenth to comply with security standards
for the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). SOURCE: The sample consists of the 1995–1996,
1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–2012 waves of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
(NPSAS).
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Table 2: Regression Discontinuity/Regression Kink Results for Labor Force Participation
(1)
Global

(2)
[-4600, 10000]

(3)
[-4000, 4000]

(4)
[-3000, 3000]

297.50***
(9.103)
-0.625***
(0.002)

155.07***
(11.85)
-0.793***
(0.014)

108.50***
(15.21)
-0.793***
(0.020)

106.03***
(12.72)
-0.788***
(0.022)

-0.039***
(0.004)
0.00002***
(0.00000)

-0.020***
(0.006)
0.00004***
(0.00000)

-0.009
(0.008)
0.00005***
(0.00000)

-0.012
(0.009)
0.0001
(0.00001)

0.0001***
(0.0000)
0.00003***
(0.00000)

-0.0001
(0.00004)
-0.00005***
(0.00000)

-0.00008
(0.00007)
-0.000007***
(0.00001)

-0.0001
(0.00009)
-0.00003
0.0002)

3
4,544,234
251,210

3
3,033,400
170,840

3
2,317,683
111,360

3
1,352,761
79,740

Pell Grant
Pell Elg.
gC
P ell × EF

Any Work
Pell Elg.
gC it
P ell × EF

τRD
τRK

Optimal ρ
AIC
Obs.

NOTE: This table shows parametric estimates for the effects of Pell Grants
on labor force participation given various bandwidths around the discontinuity and kink in Pell Grant eligibility. Exogenous controls include controls
for student gender, race, dependency status, attendance status, residency
status, and year fixed effects. SOURCE: The sample consists of the 1995–
1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–2012 waves of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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Table 3: Regression Discontinuity/Regression Kink Results for Hours Worked
(1)
Global

(2)
[-4600, 10000]

(3)
[-4000, 4000]

(4)
[-3000, 3000]

297.50***
(9.103)
-0.625***
(0.002)

155.07***
(11.85)
-0.793***
(0.014)

108.50***
(15.21)
-0.793***
(0.020)

106.03***
(12.72)
-0.788***
(0.022)

-1.837***
(0.135)
0.0006***
(0.0000)

-0.899***
(0.204)
0.0007***
(0.0002)

-0.531**
(0.281)
0.002***
(0.0003)

-0.112
(0.317)
0.002***
(0.0006)

-0.006***
(0.0005)
-0.001***
(0.0000)

-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.0009***
(0.0003)

-0.005*
(0.003)
-0.002***
(0.0004)

-0.001
(0.003)
-0.002***
(0.0007)

3
6.312,835
251,210

3
4,241,477
170,840

3
2,888,977
117,040

3
1,914,430
79,740

Pell Grant
Pell Elg.
gC
P ell × EF

Job Hour
Pell Elg.
gC
P ell × EF

τbRD
τbRK
Optimal ρ
AIC
Obs.

NOTE: This table shows parametric estimates for the effects of Pell
Grants on hours worked given various bandwidths around the discontinuity and kink in Pell Grant eligibility. Exogenous controls include controls for student gender, race, dependency status, attendance status, residency status, and year fixed effects. SOURCE: The sample consists of
the 1995–1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–2012 waves
of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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Table 4: The Effects of Pell Grants on Grades
(1)
Global

(2)
[-4600, 10000]

(3)
[-4000, 4000]

(4)
[-3000, 3000]

290.94***
(9.044)
-0.635***
(0.002)

203.15***
(10.72)
-0.693***
(0.008)

163.51***
(11.75)
-0.841***
(0.018)

147.51***
(9.711)
-0.801***
(0.021)

10.99***
(0.722)
0.007***
(0.000)

6.397
(0.879)
-0.0006
(0.001)

3.558***
(1.031)
-0.004***
(0.002)

2.530***
(1.137)
-0.004*
(0.002)

0.038***
(0.003)
-0.010***
(0.000)

0.031***
(0.005)
0.000
(0.001)

0.022***
(0.005)
0.005***
(0.002)

0.017***
(0.008)
0.005*
(0.003)

2
2
2
7,085,073
4,713,3323
3,195,754
248,720
168,540
114,950
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

2
2,104,374
77,710

Pell Grant
Pell Elg.
gC
P ell × EF

GPA
Pell Elg.
gC
P ell × EF

τbRD
τbRK
Optimal ρ
AIC
Obs.

NOTE: This table shows parametric estimates for the effects of Pell Grants on GPA given
various bandwidths around the discontinuity and kink in Pell Grant eligibility. Exogenous
controls include controls for student gender, race, dependency status, attendance status,
residency status, and year fixed effects. SOURCE: The sample consists of the 1995–1996,
1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–2012 waves of the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
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